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And yet it moves (down) 
Irrespective of the specific causes of the 2008-09 crisis, 
writes Esteban Ezequiel Maito, there is an undeniable 
tendency for the rate of profit to fall 
 
In recent issues of the Weekly Worker a controversy between Arthur Bough
1
, on the one 
side, and Bruce Wallace and Steve Dobbs
2
, on the other, has developed over some 
interesting questions. 
To begin with, let me say that Arthur Bough should at least take the trouble to read my 
articles and not draw conclusions about my position through a simple reading of a blog 
comment. I have written a paper that estimates - obviously in very rough way - the 
turnover speed of circulating capital in four countries (on the same methodological base). 
If Bough reads it, he would avoid falling into the unrealistic assumptions on fixed capital 
that he makes in his examples. He would also do well to take a look at my data series, 
which include annual rates of profit and surplus value.
3
 
In another article, I have estimated the rate of profit on fixed capital in 14 countries, 
which currently account for 60% of the world economy.
4
 That article contains my own 
estimates, including an earlier version for the United Kingdom, and those of other 
authors. The inclusion of a rate of profit on fixed capital for the Chinese economy since 
1978 is the result of a series built up by other authors (and on the same basis as the other 
13 studies). However, in this article I emphasised the relevance of the rate of profit in 
China mainly in the last two decades, when its conversion into a capitalist country 
became a fundamental fact from a systemic point of view. In case there is any doubt, I 
consider irrelevant and improbable the existence of a rate of profit in 1978 in China. To 
question that research over that specific aspect is at least superficial. 
My work has never sought to arrive at a specific explanation for the crisis of 2008-09, 
nor develop a specific theory of crisis, but simply to check whether or not there is a long-
term downward trend in the rate of profit and try to establish some elementary 
connections, including those related to the period of partial recovery in profitability that 
started in 1982. I understand that the results can be shocking to those who deny the 
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tendency of the rate of profit to fall, even more when the debate itself has been practically 
focused on just one country, the United States, and that research tends to confirm the 
tendency in a highly representative group of countries. 
So this article is not intended to explain the current crisis, but to contribute to the 
debate on the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and in particular in the case of the 
United Kingdom. 
The tendency of the rate of profit to fall 
Capitalist production consists of a valorisation process (M-M’) through the exploitation 
of the labour force (M-C...P...-C’-M’). The capital advanced in the form of money (M) is 
exchanged for commodities (C) - means of production, raw materials (constant capital or 
CC) and labour force (variable capital or VC). The secret of capitalist production is that 
the labour force is able to generate more than its reproduction value: namely a surplus 
value. For this reason, the capital advanced for the labour force is variable capital, while 
capital advanced for the means of production (machinery, infrastructure) and raw 
materials is constant capital. 
Thus, the production process (P) occurs when the labour force, using the means of 
production, transforms inputs which are then realised in a mass of commodities of a 
greater value than the original money advanced (M’). The final product includes the 
value of constant capital consumed, plus an additional amount generated by the labour 
force, equal to variable capital (the reproduction value of the labour force) exchanged 
with the capitalist, and a surplus value. Thus capital transmutes from money-capital to 
commodity-capital, then productive-capital, finally returning to the form of commodity-
capital and money-capital of a greater value. This last step is the one that involves the 
sale on the market (C’-M’): ie, the realisation of the profit and the completion of the 
valorisation process. 
There is continual pressure for each capitalist to sell at a lower price than competitors 
and so raise market share. This implies a constantly increasing expenditure mainly on 
fixed capital - equipment and infrastructure - which enables the productivity of labour to 
rise, or labour time necessary to produce commodities to be reduced, thus reducing the 
individual value, including that of the cost of reproduction of the labour force. But to do 
this, there will be a relative rise in the value of constant capital compared to that of 
variable capital (for the reproduction of the labour force). 
Capital’s sole purpose is to increase the surplus value extracted from the labour force, 
but its only means of doing so is by increasing constant capital relative to variable capital, 
the latter being the only source of profits. So capital finds it own internal limit: 
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The means - unconditional development of the productive forces of society - comes 
continually into conflict with the limited purpose, the self-expansion of the existing capital.
5
 
In Marx’s terms, this downward trend in the rate of profit would occur regardless of a 
decline or stagnation in wages relative to profits: ie, constant or rising rate of surplus 
value (profits/variable capital): 
This continual relative decrease of the variable capital vis-à-vis the constant, and 
consequently the total, capital is identical with the progressively higher organic composition 
of the social capital in its average. It is likewise just another expression for the progressive 
development of the social productivity of labour, which is demonstrated precisely by the fact 
that the same number of labourers, in the same time - ie, with less labour - convert an ever-
increasing quantity of raw and auxiliary materials into products, thanks to the growing 
application of machinery and fixed capital in general … This mode of production produces 
a progressive relative decrease of the variable capital as compared to the constant capital, 
and consequently a continuously rising organic composition of the total capital. The 
immediate result of this is that the rate of surplus value, at the same, or even a rising, degree 
of labour exploitation, is represented by a continually falling general rate of profit.
6
 
This does not deny the fact that the rate of profit may show periods of growth, but these 
exist precisely because the countervailing forces manage to reverse this downward 
pressure for a time. This gives Marx´s law the character of a tendency: 
We have thus seen in a general way that the same influences which produce a tendency in 
the general rate of profit to fall also call forth counter-effects, which hamper, retard and 
partly paralyse this fall. The latter do not do away with the law, but impair its effect. 
Otherwise, it would not be the fall of the general rate of profit, but rather its relative 
slowness, that would be incomprehensible. Thus, the law acts only as a tendency. And it is 
only under certain circumstances and only after long periods that its effects become 
strikingly pronounced.
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The tendency of the rate of profit to fall is an inherent aspect of the capitalist mode of 
production. It is the logical conclusion of the Marxian law of value, his explanation of 
technological change, competition and the formation of a general rate of profit 
(debunkers have usually applied lazy revisionism in these matters too). Marx himself 
states this obvious connection between his theory of value and the downward trend, 
which appears expressed in the value of any particular commodity as the “economic cell 
of bourgeois society”: 
Since the development of the productiveness and the correspondingly higher composition of 
capital sets in motion an ever-increasing quantity of means of production through a 
constantly decreasing quantity of labour, every aliquot part of the total product - ie, every 
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single commodity, or each particular lot of commodities in the total mass of products - 
absorbs less living labour, and also contains less materialised labour, both in the 
depreciation of the fixed capital applied and in the raw and auxiliary materials consumed. 
Hence every single commodity contains a smaller sum of labour materialised in means of 
production and of labour newly added during production. This causes the price of the 
individual commodity to fall. But the mass of profits contained in the individual commodities 
may nevertheless increase if the rate of the absolute or relative surplus value grows. The 
commodity contains less newly added labour, but its unpaid portion grows in relation to its 
paid portion. However, this is the case only within certain limits. With the absolute amount 
of living labour newly incorporated in individual commodities decreasing enormously as 
production develops, the absolute mass of unpaid labour contained in them will likewise 
decrease, however much it may have grown as compared to the paid portion.
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As can be seen, there is a huge (and non-casual) similarity in Marx’s arguments about the 
value components in commodities and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Both refer 
to the same reality from two different angles. In both cases the increase in the rate of 
surplus value has clear limits in offsetting the relative increase in objectified labour 
(constant capital) in determining both the value of commodities and the rate of profit. 
The connection between the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and the law 
of value is such that, in fact, the first is practically established in volume 1 of Capital - 
for instance in the ‘General law of capitalist accumulation’ (chapter 25): 
The accumulation of capital, though originally appearing as its quantitative extension only, 
is effected, as we have seen, under a progressive qualitative change in its composition, 
under a constant increase of its constant, at the expense of its variable, constituent.
9
 
It is the same principle - the very tendency of capital to further increase constant capital 
(fixed and circulating, but mostly fixed) compared to the variable - which establishes the 
downward trend in the rate of profit. Constantly Marx makes clear both the validity of the 
law and this foundation. In chapter 25 of volume 3 he writes: 
As demonstrated in part 3 of this book, the rate of profit decreases in proportion to the 
mounting accumulation of capital and the correspondingly increasing productivity of social 
labour, which is expressed precisely in the relative and progressive decrease of the variable 
as compared to the constant portion of capital. To produce the same rate of profit after the 
constant capital set in motion by one labourer increases tenfold, the surplus labour-time 
would have to increase tenfold, and soon the total labour-time, and finally the entire 24 
hours of a day, would not suffice, even if wholly appropriated by capital.
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Turnover of circulating capital 
The capitalist advances circulating capital, as inputs and wages, but recovers this capital, 
not in a year, but when the commodities containing such capital are sold. So that if the 
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capitalist buys a ton of steel in January and in March sells it after its transformation into 
metal tubes, by April he has already recovered the amount paid for the steel in January. 
So in April’s production he only reinvests the circulating capital advanced in January. 
Thus the value of the circulating capital is totally transferred to the final product after 
each production process and is recovered by the capitalist once those commodities are 
sold, to be newly released on production and valorised. 
The annual wage bill thus relates to the amount of variable capital advanced, multiplied 
by the annual number of turnovers performed. Indeed, the capitalist does not advance the 
amount of the annual wage bill, but only the variable capital, so only the latter must be 
included in the annual rate of profit. 
Since it is the labour force, using machinery, which transforms the inputs representing 
circulating constant capital, the turnover of variable capital is similar to that, although it 
can be speculated that it is somewhat lower, due to the time lag between purchase of 
inputs and their real availability (obviously variations and complexities in this regard in 
reality are huge). Fixed constant capital turnover takes several years, transferring to the 
product only a minor portion of its value in a year. In national accounts this transfer 
appears as the depreciation or consumption of fixed capital. 
The picture that Bough sought to generate without any basis is that the increase in the 
turnover speed of circulating capital can keep the annual rate of profit high and even 
growing. But this can only be said if he ignores the amount of fixed capital advanced 
relative to living labour - information actually present in many official national accounts 
(fixed capital series compared to gross domestic product or wage bill series). 
As advanced capital, constant and variable circulating capital becomes of an 
increasingly negligible magnitude relative to fixed constant capital, due to the increase in 
turnover speed. So the rate of profit on fixed capital, given the continued impulse to 
technological change and mechanisation, is increasingly convergent and related to the 
annual rate of profit. The increase in turnover speed of circulating capital is a 
countervailing force, but its incidence and relevance is not what Bough suggests. Fixed 
capital in the Netherlands in 2005 was 93.3% and Japan 92.6% of the total capital 
advanced, while in 1965 their share was 86.5% and 66.7% respectively (in my estimates 
annual turnovers were approximately 12 in 2005 and 5 in 1965). This trend is always the 
same because the turnover speed will increase with the development of productive forces. 
Obviously from the point of view of distribution, the magnitude of variable capital still 
remains critical for the amount of surplus value. 
 
 6 
UNITED KINGDOM 1855-2009 
Let us now turn to my estimate of the rate of profit in the UK since 1855 (see Fig 1). It 
would be very interesting to see if any debunker of the tendency of the rate of profit to 
fall has any different estimate that could enlighten us. But it appears to be a distinctive 
feature of the debunkers in general, and particularly Marxists debunkers, not to provide 
such data. Recently Thomas Piketty tried to do so, but merely exposed his own incredible 
misunderstanding of Marxian theory.
11
 
I have based my estimate on the reproductive fixed capital series of the UK’s Office 
for National Statistics and the distribution shares on Piketty’s data applied to the ONS 
official series for gross domestic product. 
RoP-F is the rate of profit on fixed capital at current prices (in concrete reality 
capitalists are governed by current market prices, so the rate of profit has to be estimated 
at current prices). RoP-FR is the rate of profit on fixed capital at constant prices: ie, 
deflated by the relative price of investment to output prices. In this case what we get is a 
rate in real terms, which shows the relative evolution of the volume of the profits to the 
volume of fixed capital. 
 
The average rate of profit on fixed capital (RoP-F) in 1990-2009 was 79.2% lower than 
the average of 1855-1874 (falling from 29.9% to 6.3%), while in the case of the real rate 
of return on fixed capital (RoP-FR), the averages were 39.8% in 1855-74 and 5.7% in 
1990-2009, a 84.9% reduction. The difference in the rate of reduction (79.2% vs 84.9%) 
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reflects the countervailing effect of the relative cheapening of constant capital expressed 
in the slower rate of all at current prices. This cheapening reduces not only the 
denominator of the rate of profit, but also expands the numerator by reducing the amount 
of the consumption of fixed capital, or depreciation, therefore increasing net profits. 
However, advanced capital consists not only of fixed capital. So I have made the 
following approximation. Taking the amount of the wage bill for each year from Piketty’s 
series, I imputed to the purchase of inputs, or intermediate consumption, a value that 
doubles the wage bill, according to the more or less stable intermediate consumption 
proportion to wages shown in other cases (eg, in the Netherlands and Japan). Finally, to 
account for the turnover speed of circulating capital, I imputed to the UK a turnover 
speed of 12 in the year 2008 and then extrapolated it backwards according to the 
variation of GDP per capita, with the turnover speed reaching 1.3 annual turnovers in 
1855. The 12 turnovers imputation in 2008 was based on my work for the Netherlands 
and the US - two economies highly related to the British, with 12.4 and 11.4 turnovers 
respectively in the same year.
12
 
Thus variable capital (VC) is equal to the annual wage bill (W), divided by annual 
turnovers (N); and constant circulating capital (CCC) is equal to inputs or intermediate 
consumption (IC), divided by annual turnovers. Then we get a rate of profit on total 
advanced capital adjusted (ROP-N, or P/K+CCC+VC) or unadjusted by turnover (ROP1, 
or P/K+IC+W). 
In the case of the rate of profit on total capital unadjusted (ROP1), the fall in the rate of 
profit was 77.5% (14.6% to 3.2%), while the adjusted rate (RoP-N) fell less, but was still 
down 67.2% (17.4% to 5.7%). Again, the difference between the two falls (67.2% vs 
77.5%) shows the countervailing effect (and only partially countervailing) of the increase 
in the turnover speed of circulating capital. 
The ‘current’ rate of profit in capitalist reality, RoP-N, is expressing the two 
countervailing factors already mentioned (the cheapening of constant capital and the 
increase in turnover speed). RoP1R shows the rate of profit on capital advanced without 
turnover adjustment and at constant prices. Its average in 1855-74 was 16.9% and 3.0% 
in 1990-2009, showing a reduction of 86.8%, the largest fall in all the measures. So the 
two major countervailing forces explain the difference in the rate of decline between the 
two measures (67.2% vs 86.8%). However, ROP-N still declined sharply by 67.2%. 
With some differences, all the rates of profit moved in a similar way, showing a clear 
downward trend in the long run. The isolation of some of the countervailing factors 
allows us to appreciate that, without them, the reduction would have been even more 
acute. 
 8 
Fig 1 shows also the convergence over the long term between the rate of profit adjusted 
by turnover (RoP-N) and the rate of profit on fixed capital (ROP-F) due to the relative 
reduction of circulating capital advanced. Since the turnover speed was lower 
historically, initially the rate of profit adjusted (RoP-N) was closer to the unadjusted rate 
(ROP1). 
A closer look 
In the next diagram (Fig 2) we can see the relation between the development of the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall and the higher relative growth of constant capital 
compared to the labour force - the only source of surplus value. For simplicity, I present 
the rate of accumulation in real or volume terms (AC or growth rate of fixed capital 
relative to the fixed capital of the current year), at constant prices. 
At current prices, this rate was clearly negative after the crisis of 1871-73 and in the 
interwar period - in both cases reflecting a sharp devaluation of capital. By contrast, in 
the 1970s its growth was even higher, reaching a maximum of 21.5% in 1975, given high 
inflation levels, and exceeding the peak reached in World War I. 
But, beyond these peculiarities, the accumulation rate in real terms allows us to 
compare more clearly the relative evolution of the mass of fixed capital to the mass of the 
labour force. 
 
Over this long period, 1855 to 2009, two opposing trends, mediated by the interwar 
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period, have developed, expressing the Marxian determinations explained above. The rate 
of accumulation reached higher levels in the post-war period (average: 3.8% per year in 
1946-2009) compared to the pre-World War I period (average: 2.0% per year in 1856-
1913). During these same periods, the growth in the number of employees showed the 
reverse, with a higher relative growth in the first part (1.3% per year) compared to post-
World War II decades (0.3%). During the interwar period, in which the rate of profit 
recovered significantly, the accumulation rate expanded at an average annual rate of 0.5% 
- less than the average increase of 0.9% of the workforce. 
Additionally, the sharp devaluation of capital in the interwar period mentioned earlier 
led to an increase in the rate of profit. Violent devaluations during crises are both a 
product of the crises and one of the ways in which capital restores the conditions for 
overcoming them. The value of fixed capital at current prices fell from £8,638 million in 
1920 to £4,625 million in 1934 (a devaluation of 46.4%, which was not recovered until 
1943). 
Obviously, I am just exposing in an abbreviated way something that requires much 
more space and the inclusion of other categories, such as the mass of profit (which does 
not always increases). However, we can identify some patterns from these series: 
 The movement of the rate of profit tends to follow the relative growth of constant 
capital and labour. When the latter increases at a higher rate compared to fixed capital, 
the rate of profit shows some restoration, and vice versa. And, since the increase of 
constant capital tends to be higher than that of the labour force over the long run, as Marx 
stated, the obvious consequence is the downward trend in the rate of profit. The 
development of the productive power of labour and accumulation also implies that a 
relative higher rate of accumulation is required for the same rate of increase in the labour 
force. 
 The partial recovery of the rate of profit observed since 1982 has been further 
supported by an increase in the rate of surplus value and a huge cheapening of constant 
capital (relative price of investment). Thus the reduction of wages and consumption of 
fixed capital shares in output implied that the share of profits showed a steady increase, 
only comparable with that observed between 1855 and 1871. During this partial recovery 
there have been changes in the contributions of particular industries to the mass of profits 
and fixed capital of the total economy: eg, the decline in manufacturing and increased 
contribution from other less mature industries like telecommunication services. 
 The accumulation rate tends to change over the short-term cycle following changes in 
the rate of profit over the short term. Once the rate of profit reaches a peak in a cycle and 
begins to decline, the rate of accumulation may keep growing or remain at high levels for 
some time. This may indicate that with a change in overall profitability capitalists 
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increase investments under the pressure of competition, until the continuation in the fall 
in the rate of profit finally ends up affecting the accumulation rate. However, when 
profitability begins to increase after the slump, the accumulation rate takes time to reflect 
that increase, probably because in such situations there is still much idle capacity. 
 The increase in the unemployment rate is strongly (inversely) related to the rate of 
profit achieved by capitalists. As shown in Fig 2, with a fall in the rate of profit, the 
relative overpopulation of labour (the industrial reserve army) increases. But this relation 
is mediated by the accumulation rate. As the rate of accumulation increases within each 
cycle, the unemployment rate is reduced. However, in the rising part of the cycle of the 
accumulation rate, and before reaching its peak, the pace of employment growth begins 
to fall, while the investment effort imposed by competition through mechanisation 
intensifies. Once the falling rate of profit is consolidated, the accumulation rate reacts by 
entering a downward phase, in which net job losses increase the unemployment rate, thus 
expanding the relative overpopulation as a countervailing force. 
Concluding remarks 
Traditionally, economic cycles have been detached analytically from any long-term trend, 
as a succession of rising and falling waves between one horizontal and straight line. 
However, there is a clear relation: long-term trends develop through a series of cycles. In 
this sense, any analysis of the cyclical crises must refer to the long-term trends of 
accumulation and profitability, without neglecting the particularities of every crisis that 
confer its specificity. 
To affirm the existence of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall in no way implies the 
existence of a ‘permanent crisis’ or that the rate of profit falls always. That crises may be 
preceded by a period of growth in the rate of profit does not deny the validity of the 
tendency. Nor does any increase in output necessarily imply a growth in the rate of profit. 
The post-war decades showed high economic growth in most economies, but over that 
particular period the rate of profit declined steadily, mainly due to the very basic reason 
that the share of investment in GDP increased more than GDP rose. Recent decades have 
shown a partial recovery of profitability in conjunction with lower GDP growth rates 
compared to post-war decades. 
The tendency of the rate of profit to fall is just another expression of the increased 
accumulation and social productivity of labour under capitalist relations of production. 
As stated above, this tendency is an inherent aspect of the mode of production and, as 
reproduction in thought of its determinations, of Marxian political economy. Paul Mattick 
points out: 
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Although it first appears in the process of circulation, the real crisis cannot be understood 
as a problem of circulation or of realisation, but only as a disruption of the process of 
reproduction as a whole, which is constituted by production and circulation together. And, 
as the process of reproduction depends on the accumulation of capital, and therefore on the 
mass of surplus value that makes accumulation possible, it is within the sphere of production 
that the decisive factors (though not the only factors) of the passage from the possibility of 
crisis to an actual crisis are to be found ... The crisis characteristic of capital thus originates 
neither in production nor in circulation taken separately, but in the difficulties that arise 
from the tendency of the profit rate to fall inherent in accumulation and governed by the law 
of value.
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The tendency of the rate of profit to fall is derived from the contradictions that constitute 
the mode of production and the commodity itself as a product of social labour under its 
particular relations of production. Marxist scientific analysis, which differs from all the 
previous socialist political traditions and all previous forms of bourgeois economics, has 
clarified that it ultimately expresses something as obvious as it is elemental: capitalism is 
a historically bounded system. But Marxism says nothing about how or when its final 
limits will be reached. 
Today, due to the increasing development of long-term statistics, we are able to make 
use of better tools that allow us to develop a more accurate analysis of the capitalist 
economy and its trends. This is one meeting between ‘theory’ and ‘data’ of which the 
debunkers have not taken note 
Statistical Annex 
   Variables in Real Terms (ONS 2006 reference year)  
Source  ONS     ONS    Piketty   
Year  Fixed Capital  
Accumulation 
Rate 
 Real GDP  
GDP 
growth 
rate 
Net 
Profits 
Consumption 
of Fixed 
Capital 
Wages 
Net Taxes 
on 
production 
RoP-FR 
  
  at market 
prices £mn  
% 
  at market 
prices £mn  
% % % % % % 
1855           61.664             59.188    36,3% 3,4% 52,7% 7,5% 34,9% 
1856           62.740  1,7%          61.989  4,7% 37,7% 3,3% 51,5% 7,5% 37,2% 
1857           63.935  1,9%          61.989  0,0% 39,1% 3,4% 50,1% 7,5% 37,9% 
1858           65.010  1,7%          62.176  0,3% 40,7% 3,5% 48,3% 7,5% 39,0% 
1859           66.265  1,9%          64.790  4,2% 38,4% 3,3% 50,8% 7,5% 37,6% 
1860           67.699  2,1%          65.910  1,7% 38,5% 3,2% 50,9% 7,5% 37,4% 
1861           69.491  2,6%          67.404  2,3% 41,3% 3,0% 48,1% 7,5% 40,1% 
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1862           71.344  2,6%          68.151  1,1% 42,5% 3,0% 47,0% 7,5% 40,6% 
1863           73.555  3,0%          69.831  2,5% 42,9% 3,1% 46,5% 7,5% 40,8% 
1864           76.064  3,3%          70.951  1,6% 43,1% 3,2% 46,3% 7,5% 40,2% 
1865           78.873  3,6%          74.125  4,5% 42,4% 3,1% 47,0% 7,5% 39,8% 
1866           81.203  2,9%          74.686  0,8% 42,4% 3,2% 46,9% 7,5% 39,0% 
1867           82.936  2,1%          73.752  -1,3% 41,8% 3,2% 47,5% 7,5% 37,2% 
1868           84.370  1,7%          76.179  3,3% 43,1% 3,3% 46,1% 7,5% 38,9% 
1869           85.624  1,5%          77.673  2,0% 43,1% 3,3% 46,2% 7,5% 39,1% 
1870           87.178  1,8%          84.208  8,4% 45,2% 3,1% 44,2% 7,5% 43,7% 
1871           89.269  2,3%          88.520  5,1% 46,6% 3,0% 43,4% 7,1% 46,2% 
1872           91.480  2,4%          88.604  0,1% 44,4% 3,2% 45,6% 6,9% 43,0% 
1873           93.571  2,2%          89.281  0,8% 43,2% 3,4% 46,8% 6,6% 41,2% 
1874           96.260  2,8%          93.001  4,2% 42,7% 3,4% 47,1% 6,8% 41,3% 
1875           99.009  2,8%          93.846  0,9% 42,0% 3,4% 47,7% 6,9% 39,8% 
1876         101.758  2,7%          94.438  0,6% 40,9% 3,5% 48,5% 7,2% 37,9% 
1877         104.566  2,7%          94.945  0,5% 39,9% 3,6% 49,2% 7,3% 36,3% 
1878         107.016  2,3%          95.706  0,8% 39,6% 3,6% 49,1% 7,6% 35,5% 
1879         109.107  1,9%          93.593  -2,2% 38,9% 3,7% 49,8% 7,5% 33,4% 
1880         110.840  1,6%       100.948  7,9% 40,5% 3,6% 48,7% 7,2% 36,9% 
1881         112.931  1,9%       102.977  2,0% 40,2% 3,6% 48,9% 7,2% 36,7% 
1882         114.664  1,5%       104.753  1,7% 38,9% 3,6% 50,3% 7,2% 35,6% 
1883         116.576  1,6%       108.135  3,2% 37,7% 3,6% 51,5% 7,3% 35,0% 
1884         118.608  1,7%       107.205  -0,9% 37,4% 3,6% 51,5% 7,5% 33,8% 
1885         120.161  1,3%       106.275  -0,9% 37,6% 3,7% 51,2% 7,5% 33,2% 
1886         121.177  0,8%       107.035  0,7% 38,8% 3,6% 50,2% 7,4% 34,2% 
1887         122.252  0,9%       111.432  4,1% 38,2% 3,5% 51,1% 7,2% 34,8% 
1888         123.507  1,0%       114.983  3,2% 38,5% 3,4% 51,2% 6,9% 35,8% 
1889         125.001  1,2%       118.703  3,2% 37,4% 3,5% 52,5% 6,7% 35,5% 
1890         126.555  1,2%       119.717  0,9% 36,5% 3,6% 53,1% 6,7% 34,6% 
1891         128.467  1,5%       122.423  2,3% 36,0% 3,5% 53,7% 6,9% 34,3% 
1892         130.379  1,5%       119.886  -2,1% 35,6% 3,5% 53,8% 7,1% 32,7% 
1893         132.231  1,4%       119.041  -0,7% 35,9% 3,5% 53,5% 7,1% 32,3% 
1894         134.203  1,5%       124.959  5,0% 36,8% 3,3% 52,9% 7,0% 34,3% 
1895         136.354  1,6%       129.017  3,2% 36,8% 3,2% 52,9% 7,1% 34,8% 
1896         138.923  1,8%       134.682  4,4% 36,4% 3,2% 53,2% 7,2% 35,3% 
1897         142.150  2,3%       135.866  0,9% 36,6% 3,3% 53,1% 7,1% 35,0% 
1898         146.153  2,7%       142.376  4,8% 37,0% 3,3% 52,9% 6,9% 36,1% 
1899         150.754  3,1%       147.702  3,7% 37,0% 3,4% 52,8% 6,8% 36,3% 
1900         155.474  3,0%       146.772  -0,6% 36,0% 3,6% 53,4% 7,0% 34,0% 
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1901         160.733  3,3%       150.408  2,5% 35,2% 3,4% 53,8% 7,5% 33,0% 
1902         166.349  3,4%       152.521  1,4% 35,2% 3,3% 53,5% 8,0% 32,2% 
1903         171.667  3,1%       151.084  -0,9% 34,5% 3,4% 54,0% 8,1% 30,3% 
1904         176.806  2,9%       153.029  1,3% 34,2% 3,4% 53,9% 8,4% 29,6% 
1905         181.347  2,5%       157.679  3,0% 34,8% 3,4% 53,7% 8,1% 30,2% 
1906         185.350  2,2%       161.568  2,5% 35,2% 3,5% 53,5% 7,7% 30,7% 
1907         188.159  1,5%       164.527  1,8% 34,8% 3,6% 54,1% 7,5% 30,5% 
1908         189.234  0,6%       158.355  -3,8% 34,3% 3,7% 54,4% 7,6% 28,7% 
1909         190.848  0,8%       162.667  2,7% 34,3% 3,6% 54,6% 7,5% 29,2% 
1910         192.580  0,9%       166.979  2,7% 33,7% 3,6% 54,9% 7,8% 29,3% 
1911         194.433  1,0%       172.559  3,3% 33,7% 3,5% 55,2% 7,6% 29,9% 
1912         196.285  0,9%       174.926  1,4% 34,1% 3,7% 54,7% 7,5% 30,4% 
1913         198.974  1,4%       182.451  4,3% 34,2% 3,7% 54,8% 7,3% 31,3% 
1914         201.782  1,4%       186.647  2,3% 31,9% 3,6% 57,5% 7,0% 29,5% 
1915         202.380  0,3%       198.506  6,4% 26,4% 4,1% 62,3% 7,1% 25,9% 
1916         201.065  -0,7%       202.338  1,9% 24,8% 4,3% 64,7% 6,2% 24,9% 
1917         198.496  -1,3%       203.797  0,7% 28,2% 4,1% 62,9% 4,8% 29,0% 
1918         198.675  0,1%       208.176  2,1% 30,7% 4,1% 61,5% 3,8% 32,1% 
1919         202.320  1,8%       187.559  -9,9% 26,9% 4,8% 62,8% 5,5% 25,0% 
1920         207.160  2,3%       172.963  -7,8% 25,5% 6,4% 61,0% 7,1% 21,3% 
1921         207.848  0,3%       155.419  -10,1% 27,1% 6,3% 59,5% 7,1% 20,3% 
1922         207.848  0,0%       165.139  6,3% 23,9% 6,0% 60,8% 9,3% 19,0% 
1923         208.536  0,3%       170.290  3,1% 21,2% 6,0% 62,1% 10,7% 17,3% 
1924         209.569  0,5%       178.649  4,9% 21,5% 5,6% 61,6% 11,2% 18,3% 
1925         211.289  0,8%       185.210  3,7% 25,7% 5,5% 58,5% 10,4% 22,5% 
1926         211.633  0,2%       179.184  -3,3% 24,8% 5,2% 59,9% 10,1% 21,0% 
1927         213.010  0,6%       193.812  8,2% 23,5% 5,5% 60,2% 10,8% 21,4% 
1928         215.419  1,1%       195.416  0,8% 24,2% 5,1% 59,9% 10,8% 21,9% 
1929         217.828  1,1%       201.199  3,0% 25,2% 5,1% 58,6% 11,0% 23,3% 
1930         219.892  0,9%       199.401  -0,9% 27,5% 5,2% 56,8% 10,5% 24,9% 
1931         221.269  0,6%       189.487  -5,0% 24,9% 5,2% 59,3% 10,6% 21,3% 
1932         220.925  -0,2%       190.313  0,4% 22,8% 5,6% 60,3% 11,3% 19,6% 
1933         218.860  -0,9%       196.582  3,3% 21,0% 5,7% 61,0% 12,2% 18,9% 
1934         219.548  0,3%       208.781  6,2% 23,1% 5,7% 59,6% 11,6% 22,0% 
1935         221.269  0,8%       216.459  3,7% 23,8% 5,2% 59,5% 11,5% 23,2% 
1936         224.022  1,2%       227.102  4,9% 23,6% 5,3% 59,9% 11,3% 23,9% 
1937         227.463  1,5%       234.975  3,5% 24,5% 5,4% 58,9% 11,2% 25,3% 
1938         231.248  1,6%       236.530  0,7% 26,0% 5,7% 57,1% 11,2% 26,6% 
1939         231.867  0,3%       247.514  4,6% 23,0% 5,6% 60,2% 11,2% 24,5% 
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1940         232.488  0,3%       275.458  11,3% 19,6% 5,5% 63,7% 11,1% 23,3% 
1941         233.107  0,3%       300.924  9,2% 22,4% 4,9% 61,0% 11,8% 28,9% 
1942         233.726  0,3%       307.047  2,0% 21,5% 4,7% 60,5% 13,3% 28,3% 
1943         234.344  0,3%       312.539  1,8% 21,3% 4,5% 60,9% 13,2% 28,4% 
1944         234.965  0,3%       297.376  -4,9% 19,6% 5,1% 62,1% 13,3% 24,8% 
1945         235.584  0,3%       281.582  -5,3% 18,5% 5,4% 63,2% 12,9% 22,1% 
1946         236.203  0,3%       273.320  -2,9% 20,1% 5,5% 62,2% 12,3% 23,3% 
1947         236.822  0,3%       269.723  -1,3% 21,2% 5,9% 62,6% 10,4% 24,1% 
1948         243.556  2,8%       279.589  3,7% 20,9% 6,1% 62,4% 10,6% 23,9% 
1949         252.535  3,6%       289.269  3,5% 19,3% 7,1% 62,2% 11,4% 22,1% 
1950         262.636  3,8%       298.626  3,2% 18,8% 7,4% 63,0% 10,9% 21,4% 
1951         271.616  3,3%       306.197  2,5% 17,8% 7,5% 63,5% 11,2% 20,1% 
1952         279.472  2,8%       307.240  0,3% 18,0% 7,9% 62,5% 11,6% 19,8% 
1953         289.574  3,5%       319.087  3,9% 18,3% 8,3% 62,2% 11,2% 20,1% 
1954         299.675  3,4%       331.876  4,0% 18,4% 8,0% 62,4% 11,2% 20,3% 
1955         312.021  4,0%       343.336  3,5% 17,5% 7,9% 63,6% 11,0% 19,3% 
1956         326.612  4,5%       347.581  1,2% 16,1% 8,1% 64,5% 11,3% 17,1% 
1957         342.325  4,6%       353.363  1,7% 16,0% 8,3% 64,6% 11,2% 16,5% 
1958         358.039  4,4%       352.952  -0,1% 16,4% 8,4% 64,3% 11,0% 16,1% 
1959         374.874  4,5%       366.553  3,9% 16,7% 8,5% 63,9% 10,9% 16,4% 
1960         393.955  4,8%       386.464  5,4% 17,6% 8,4% 63,1% 10,9% 17,2% 
1961         416.402  5,4%       396.023  2,5% 17,1% 8,4% 64,3% 10,3% 16,3% 
1962         437.727  4,9%       400.903  1,2% 16,8% 8,5% 64,5% 10,2% 15,4% 
1963         456.162  4,0%       405.166  1,1% 16,2% 8,7% 64,8% 10,3% 14,4% 
1964         482.834  5,5%       427.915  5,6% 16,0% 8,6% 65,0% 10,4% 14,2% 
1965         523.626  7,8%       439.592  2,7% 15,5% 8,6% 65,1% 10,9% 13,0% 
1966         534.216  2,0%       447.628  1,8% 14,3% 8,6% 65,8% 11,3% 12,0% 
1967         575.008  7,1%       455.667  1,8% 13,8% 8,7% 65,8% 11,8% 10,9% 
1968         616.584  6,7%       475.499  4,4% 13,7% 8,7% 65,6% 12,0% 10,6% 
1969         655.415  5,9%       486.319  2,3% 13,0% 8,7% 65,6% 12,7% 9,6% 
1970         687.577  4,7%       496.224  2,0% 10,3% 8,9% 66,9% 13,9% 7,4% 
1971         730.330  5,9%       507.493  2,3% 11,4% 9,1% 65,7% 13,8% 7,9% 
1972         766.340  4,7%       524.782  3,4% 13,0% 9,4% 64,8% 12,8% 8,9% 
1973         807.358  5,1%       564.814  7,6% 14,6% 9,9% 63,6% 11,8% 10,2% 
1974         848.115  4,8%       559.310  -1,0% 12,9% 10,1% 66,6% 10,4% 8,5% 
1975         882.282  3,9%       556.438  -0,5% 11,0% 10,8% 69,1% 9,1% 6,9% 
1976         911.714  3,2%       571.437  2,7% 13,1% 11,2% 66,8% 9,0% 8,2% 
1977         942.650  3,3%       585.241  2,4% 14,6% 11,3% 64,5% 9,6% 9,1% 
1978         976.111  3,4%       599.873  2,5% 12,8% 11,8% 64,5% 10,9% 7,8% 
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1979     1.011.465  3,5%       613.214  2,2% 12,0% 11,7% 65,3% 11,0% 7,3% 
1980     1.045.577  3,3%       601.170  -2,0% 8,7% 11,8% 67,1% 12,4% 5,0% 
1981     1.066.224  1,9%       593.867  -1,2% 7,0% 12,2% 67,3% 13,5% 3,9% 
1982     1.090.781  2,3%       607.758  2,3% 7,8% 12,6% 65,7% 13,9% 4,3% 
1983     1.119.529  2,6%       628.842  3,5% 8,3% 12,6% 64,3% 14,8% 4,7% 
1984     1.155.927  3,1%       643.602  2,3% 9,0% 12,3% 64,6% 14,0% 5,0% 
1985     1.198.265  3,5%       668.508  3,9% 9,8% 12,3% 63,9% 14,0% 5,4% 
1986     1.234.455  2,9%       693.529  3,7% 10,1% 12,2% 64,0% 13,7% 5,6% 
1987     1.277.911  3,4%       723.646  4,3% 10,1% 11,8% 63,7% 14,4% 5,7% 
1988     1.335.827  4,3%       758.511  4,8% 9,7% 11,6% 64,1% 14,6% 5,5% 
1989     1.405.181  4,9%       776.039  2,3% 9,1% 11,2% 65,1% 14,5% 5,1% 
1990     1.469.626  4,4%       783.402  0,9% 9,4% 11,0% 65,4% 14,2% 5,0% 
1991     1.517.887  3,2%       776.229  -0,9% 8,2% 11,3% 66,5% 14,0% 4,2% 
1992     1.565.219  3,0%       778.517  0,3% 7,1% 11,8% 66,2% 14,9% 3,5% 
1993     1.615.896  3,1%       796.661  2,3% 9,5% 11,4% 64,2% 14,8% 4,7% 
1994     1.668.886  3,2%       828.341  4,0% 11,1% 11,3% 63,2% 14,4% 5,5% 
1995     1.722.957  3,1%       851.008  2,7% 12,4% 10,8% 62,6% 14,3% 6,1% 
1996     1.787.194  3,6%       874.048  2,7% 13,8% 10,4% 61,1% 14,6% 6,8% 
1997     1.853.066  3,6%       902.553  3,3% 13,8% 10,3% 61,6% 14,3% 6,7% 
1998     1.951.110  5,0%       936.595  3,8% 13,3% 9,9% 62,5% 14,3% 6,4% 
1999     2.057.106  5,2%       969.982  3,6% 13,6% 9,4% 62,9% 14,2% 6,4% 
2000     2.155.037  4,5%   1.007.961  3,9% 11,7% 9,6% 63,9% 14,8% 5,5% 
2001     2.262.675  4,8%   1.030.699  2,3% 11,2% 9,6% 64,3% 14,9% 5,1% 
2002     2.357.831  4,0%   1.049.074  1,8% 12,7% 9,5% 63,5% 14,3% 5,6% 
2003     2.438.384  3,3%   1.078.684  2,8% 13,4% 9,5% 63,2% 13,9% 5,9% 
2004     2.519.128  3,2%   1.109.830  2,9% 13,8% 9,1% 63,3% 13,7% 6,1% 
2005     2.596.292  3,0%   1.135.838  2,3% 13,7% 9,4% 63,2% 13,7% 6,0% 
2006     2.674.955  2,9%   1.169.185  2,9% 14,3% 9,0% 63,3% 13,3% 6,3% 
2007     2.771.104  3,5%   1.201.018  2,7% 13,8% 9,3% 63,5% 13,4% 6,0% 
2008     2.859.646  3,1%   1.199.319  -0,1% 15,5% 9,3% 62,0% 13,2% 6,5% 
2009     2.916.618  2,0%   1.139.859  -5,0% 14,6% 8,5% 64,2% 12,7% 5,7% 
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